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Abstract: This comparative study of two cases draws upon alternative theories of policy change 
to explore the dynamics of tuition policy formation in Canada. The research examined five key 
dimensions in the policy episodes: (a) goals of policy change, (b) the politics of policy 
formation, (c) policy coalitions and their stability over time, (d) influence of elected officials and 
non-elected policy actors, and (e) the effects of environmental conditions such as changing 
public opinion, change in government, and provincial fiscal climate. Analysis revealed important 
agenda-setting activities, as well as insights into how policy coalitions influence decision-making 
in this policy arena. 
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Resumé: Cette étude comparative de deux cas de changement de politique en matière de droits 
de scolarité s’appuie sur de nouvelles théories de changement de politique pour explorer la 
dynamique du changement de politique en matière de droits de scolarité. La recherche portait sur 
cinq aspects clés des périodes politiques : (a) les objectifs du changement de politique (b) la 
politique de l’élaboration de la politique (c) les coalitions politiques et leur stabilité au fil des 
années (d) l’influence des représentants élus et des acteurs politiques non élus (e) les effets des 
conditions environnementales comme un changement dans l’opinion publique, un changement 
de gouvernement et le climat fiscal provincial. L’analyse a révélé d’importantes activités 
d’élaboration d’ordre du jour de même que des idées sur la façon dont les coalitions politiques 
influencent la prise de décision dans le domaine politique. 
Mots-Clés: droits de scolarité; politique comparative 
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In the shift from elite to mass post-
secondary education since World War II 
(Kirby, 2009; Jones, 1997; Trow, 2011), 
policy-makers have sought to achieve 
optimal cost-sharing arrangements for post-
secondary education institutions and 
students. In the struggle over ideas of 
accessibility and affordability, tuition fee 
policy is possibly the most visibly active and 
contested policy area in Canadian post-
secondary policy-making. Provincial tuition 
fee policies over the past two decades have 
ranged from complete deregulation of tuition 
fees to complete regulation through the 
tuition “freeze” (Rexe, 2014). Episodes of 
major tuition policy change have attracted 
significant attention and emerging literature 
(Boggs, 2009; Jones, 2004; Rexe, 2012, 
2015). Significant interest mobilization on 
tuition fee policy, including Canada’s largest 
and longest student demonstration in Quebec 
in 2012 (Begin-Caouette and Jones, 2014), 
raises important questions about post-
secondary policy-making process, and 
illustrates how little is known about 
provincial post-secondary policy agenda-
setting and decision making. This study 
contributes further understanding of how 
and with what effect interests are articulated 
and mobilized within the post-secondary 
policy-making arena. 
Tuition is an increasingly important 
structural component of the financing of 
higher education in Canada. There are a 
number of arguments as to why this is so. 
Jones and Young (2004) argue that the 
complexities of market economics as well as 
federal-provincial relations in Canada assert 
influence over higher education policy, 
while Fisher et al. (2006) observe a general 
trend toward funding individuals rather than 
institutions. Quirke and Davies (2002) 
examine tuition in light of new market-
orientation and entrepreneurial activities at 
the institutional level. Kirby (2007) and 
Fisher et al. (2006) attribute tuition increases 
in Canada to reductions in federal 
government transfer. Conlon (2006) and the 
Canadian Association of University 
Teachers (2004) trace the decline of federal 
funding and related tuition impacts. It has 
been observed elsewhere that institutions 
historically “backed into” tuition to meet the 
difference between the costs of providing 
educational services and declining 
government grants (McKeown, 1982). The 
result of this shift has resulted in price 
increases for students; the national average 
for full-time undergraduate student tuition in 
2013/2014 was $5,772—an increase of 3.3 
per cent over the previous year, during 
which time the CPI was 1.3% (Statistics 
Canada, September 12, 2013). Government 
funding constitutes a decreasing proportion 
of university revenue, and tuition an 
increasing proportion; in 2009, 58.3 per cent 
of university operating revenue was covered 
by government funding and tuition covered 
35.3 per cent (Canadian Association of 
University Teachers, 2010). Table 1 shows 
the relative differences between provinces in 
level of tuition as a per cent of university 
operating revenues, with Ontario the highest 
at 44.5% and Newfoundland and Labrador 
the lowest at 15.9 per cent.  
Table 1. Tuition as a per cent of university 
operating revenue, by province 
Province 2009 
Newfoundland and Labrador 15.9 
Prince Edward Island 27.4 
Nova Scotia 41.3 
New Brunswick 37.3 
Quebec 21.1 
Ontario 44.5 






British Columbia 40.3 
Source: CAUT Almanac of Post-Secondary 
Education 2011-12 
For some policy stakeholders, highly 
subsidized public education is an important 
part of the Canadian bargain (Mackenzie, 
2005) and tuition fees were once only 
tolerated as a “necessary evil” (Quirke and 
Davies, 2002). In that light, increases in 
tuition fees are viewed as a lost entitlement 
(Ward, 2007). For others, tuition brings to 
post-secondary education some of the 
virtues of the market, including the 
presumption of greater efficiency, equity, 
producer responsiveness, and timelier 
student progress to degree completion 
(Johnstone, 2003). Within the public policy-
making process, there is a gap in scholarly 
attention to how governments are influenced 
in their decisions to make major changes to 
tuition policy. This gap has been referred to 
as a “blind spot” in post-secondary 
education policy studies (Enders, 2004), 
which have tended to focus on policy effects 
to the neglect of the “input side” of policy 
formation. There is a growing interest on the 
influence of political factors on decision-
making on post-secondary education policy. 
As a result, scholars have called for 
expanded empirical research into the policy 
and politics of higher education (Bastedo, 
2007; Jones, 1998; McLendon, 2003; 
McLendon and Hearn, 2003; St. John and 
Parsons, 2004; Weaver-Hightower, 2008), 
particularly important given the impact on 
educational outcomes, and the particularly 
complex array of political forces and 
interests that are brought to bear on 
formation of education policy. Recent 
international efforts include examination of 
political variables in higher education policy 
and state financing decisions in particular 
(Dougherty, Nienhusser, and Vega, 2010; 
Dar, 2012; Doyle, 2012; McLendon, 
Mokher, and Doyle, 2008; Neill, 2009; 
Sponsler, 2009; Tandberg, 2008); American 
state government funding and tuition have 
been found to depend on political as well as 
economic factors (Fethke, 2005; Griswold 
and Marine, 1996; Lowry, 2001; Tandberg, 
2008, 2010a, 2010b). It has been suggested 
that political contests around tuition policy 
are related to resource scarcity and political 
competition (Johnstone, 2004); in his study 
of American financial aid policy, Hearn 
(2001) found that social and political 
considerations and dynamics in the policy 
process have greater influence on decision-
making than rational analysis. Actors 
identified as influencing decision-making in 
the United States include interest groups, 
coordinating bodies, institutional boards, 
legislature and legislative committees, and 
the state governor (Layzel and Lyddon, 
1990; Lowry, 2001; Pusser, 2000). Canadian 
scholars have examined the influence of 
federal policy on post-secondary education 
(Fisher et al., 2006; Fisher, Rubenson, Jones 
and Shanahan, 2009; Shanahan and Jones, 
2007; Wellen, Axelrod, Desai-Trilokekar 
and Shanahan, 2012) as well as forces 
influencing policymaking in different 
Canadian provinces (Axelrod, Desai-
Trilokekar, Shanahan and Wellen, 2011; 
Axelrod, Shanahan, Wellen and Desai-
Trilokekar, 2012; Jones, 1997; Padure and 
Jones, 2009). This study contributes to a 
small body of work internationally on tuition 
policy and politics (Sponsler, 2009; Warne, 
2008) and of the Canadian politics of higher 
education finance and policy formation 
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(Boggs, 2009; Jones, 1998; Rounce, 2010; 
Smith, 2010; Trick, 2005), increasingly of 
essential interest to scholars as well as 
advocates, practitioners, and policy makers. 
Policy-making can be best 
understood as a political process (Brewer 
and DeLeon, 1983; Howlett and Ramesh, 
2003; Pal, 2006). As a result, the political 
dimensions and dynamics are one of the 
most important considerations in the study 
of the policy formation process. Agenda-
setting is the means by which an issue or a 
set of political controversies within a 
community becomes a concern warranting 
attention of the polity (Cobb and Elder, 
1972); agenda-setting is a political and 
contingent process, emerging from ongoing 
competition among issue proponents to gain 
attention over substantive matters relating to 
the distribution of positions or resources 
(Cobb and Elder, 1972; Dearing and Rogers, 
1996). Generally, the literature has identified 
three distinct agendas, their interactions, and 
reciprocal relationships: the media agenda, 
or the coverage of issues or problems; the 
public agenda, including public mood or 
opinion; and the policy agenda, or those 
issues under active debate (Dearing and 
Rogers, 1996; Kingdon, 2003; Soroka, 
2002). Different means or modes of agenda-
setting have been identified, including 
interest mobilization, problem definition, 
and issue framing (Dearing and Rogers, 
1996; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). The 
international higher education policy and 
finance literature has noted a need to 
empirically examine the impact of interest 
groups on policy and finance of higher 
education (Gove & Carpenter, 1977; Lowry, 
2001; Zumeta, 2004). Relatively little 
scholarship has been undertaken to assess 
whether and to what extent Canadian 
interest groups influence post-secondary 
policy. Jones (1998) notes that surprising 
little attention has been given to how 
provincial governments make policy 
decisions concerning higher education. An 
understudied area in policy studies more 
generally, Smith and Larimer (2009) have 
called for more systemic, empirical, and 
comparative analysis of decision-making of 
policy-makers. The policy process literature 
in Canada has greater coverage in 
examination of federal policy making than 
provincial policy making, and these gaps 
have been noted in the analysis of 
provincial-level policy processes (Howlett, 
2009; Imbeau, 2000).  
Conceptual Framework 
A key question is how governments 
respond to social, economic, and political 
factors by making significant changes to 
post-secondary policy, and tuition policy in 
particular. Of particular importance is how 
and with what effect are interests articulated 
and mobilized within post-secondary policy-
making arenas, and why certain issues rise 
to the agenda of decision-making and by 
what means does this occur. Given the 
substantive tuition policy experiments 
undertaken in Canada, the role organized 
interests and politics play in the decision-
making process has not been given sufficient 
scholarly investigation considering its 
impact on individuals, families, 
communities, and institutions. 
This study employs an analytical 
framework informed by two alternative 
theories of policy change, based on research 
undertaken by Ness (2008), developed from 
Kingdon (2003) and Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith (1993), and consistent with 
recommendations of McLendon (2003). The 
analytical framework has five key 
dimensions and operationalized sub-
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 9, No. 2, 2015 pp. 79-111 
84 
 
questions for both within-case and cross-
case comparative case analysis. These key 
dimensions were indicated in the policy 
literature as important elements in 
understanding major policy change, and are 
(a) program goals and their clarity, (b) the 
politics of policy formation, (c) policy 
coalitions and their stability over time, (d) 
influence of elected officials and non-elected 
policy actors, (e) the effects of external 
influences such as change in public opinion 
on related issues, change in government, and 
the provincial fiscal condition. The 
analytical framework was applied given the 
type of policy issue under investigation, the 
types of variables and data available and 
collected, and the context in which the 
policy was situated. The full framework is 
listed in Appendix 1. 
A significant and growing amount of 
empirical research has combined two or 
more theoretical models to examine aspects 
of the policy process, including these two 
models in particular (Dougherty, 
Nienhusser, and Vega, 2010; McLendon, 
Heller, and Young, 2005; Mintrom, 2000; 
Ness, 2008), which have been used in both 
Canadian and American policy contexts. 
Drawing on the conceptual body of literature 
on the policy process, these two theoretical 
models were selected due to their predicted 
contributions to this study, and are 
complementary by providing alternative 
lenses on the policy formulation process). 
Kingdon’s comprehensive framework for 
understanding agenda-setting and 
alternatives is a critical vehicle for analyzing 
public policy development and change. The 
multiple streams model (MSM) (Kingdon, 
2003) uses the stages typology of the policy 
cycle, and contemplates the interactions 
between three largely independent streams 
which influence policy-making. The 
problem stream is comprised of information 
about various policy problems and the 
proponents of various issue definitions, 
including media coverage, events and other 
factors that shape opinion about policy 
problems; the policy stream involves the 
proponents of solutions to policy problems, 
the factors affecting ideas, and the 
identification and formulation of 
alternatives; and the politics stream consists 
of factors which influence elections and the 
behaviours of legislators. Key events merge 
the politics, problem, and policy streams and 
therefore the opening of the policy window, 
which occurs in a short period of time when 
conditions are favourable to policy change. 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, 1999) 
considers that policy change can be 
explained through two primary causes: the 
endogenous variable of beliefs and values of 
the coalition, and exogenous changes in the 
policy arena. Policy change as result of 
changes in beliefs in a subsystem arise from 
a number of factors, including policy-
oriented learning, changes in actors, or 
changes in the external environment, 
including changes in socio-economic 
conditions, public opinion, systemic 
governing coalition, or spillage from other 
policy domains. 
Objective and Approach 
The overall aim of this study is to 
contribute to the descriptive and conceptual 
understanding of provincial post-secondary 
policy formation processes in Canadian 
provinces. This study is situated within the 
broader study of Canadian policy formation 
and within the post-secondary policy arena, 
where there is a need for more theoretically 
informed, empirical, and comparative 
analysis of decision making of policy-
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 9, No. 2, 2015 pp. 79-111 
85 
 
makers. The specific objective of this study 
was to identify the factors contributing to 
government decisions to change existing 
tuition freeze policy. The research question 
guiding this study is: Why and how does 
tuition policy land on provincial government 
decision agendas? Theoretical frameworks 
from political science are increasingly used 
in educational policy research (Conner and 
Rabovsky, 2011). This study employs two 
alternative theories of the policy process, the 
multiple streams model (MSM) (Kingdon, 
2003) and the advocacy coalition framework 
(ACF) (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993), 
to develop two provincial case studies for 
comparative analysis, where a long-term 
policy of frozen tuition was changed. 
Comparative case approaches are highly 
applicable to studies of policy formation in 
post-secondary education (Shaw and Heller, 
2007). 
The two policy episodes for study 
were selected using purposive sampling. 
British Columbia in 2002/03 shifted from a 
policy of tuition reduction to deregulated 
tuition, and Manitoba, after many years of 
frozen tuition, moved to a policy of 
restricted tuition increases in 2009/10. These 
episodes occurred in different economic 
conditions as well as different antecedent 
policy histories, political histories, political 
parties, and system characteristics and size. 
The variation in these characteristics 
contributes insights into questions about 
Canadian tuition policy formation dynamics. 
Data were collected for each case through 
systematic investigation, employing two key 
research tools: content analysis of relevant 
documentary materials and interviews. 
Historical and qualitative methods were 
used, employing content analysis of relevant 
documentary materials (systematic review of 
documentary evidence, including scholarly 
literature, policy documents, government 
reports, legislative records, and media 
records) and interviews of policy actors.  
Interviews were chosen as an 
approach to data gathering given the 
theoretical frameworks being used; 
interviewing is most often useful when 
interviewees have shaped the world around 
them (Rathbun, 2008). In this study, 
participants were identified in two stages: 
(1) targeted individuals identified through 
archival documents, including review of 
government and organizational charts, and 
input from an expert panel, and (2) 
additional informants recommended through 
the research process by key informants, 
using snowball sampling. The identification 
of key actors in the policy process consisted 
of examining literature from interest groups, 
policy institutes, scholarly contributions and 
policy studies, policy documents, legislative 
records, and media coverage. The snowball 
sample built on insights and connections 
made by informants and in the document 
record. There were a total of 45 informant 
interviews conducted for this research, with 
a variety of policy actors including senior 
civil servants, elected officials, interest 
group representatives, institutional leaders, 
and researchers. To ensure consistency in 
the study’s exploration and analysis of key 
themes, and to allow for follow-up 
questions, a semi-structured interview was 
used; in addition to open-ended questions, 
there were scaled questions on reasons for 
policy change and activities of policy actors. 
The questions focussed on five key areas: (a) 
program goals and their clarity, (b) the 
politics of policy formation, (c) policy 
coalitions and their stability over time, (d) 
influence of elected officials and non-elected 
policy actors, (e) the effects of external 
influences such as change in public opinion 
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on related issues, change in government, and 
the provincial fiscal condition. Member 
checking was employed to review the policy 
history for accuracy, confirming credibility 
of the account (Stake, 1995).  
Case of British Columbia 
On February 11, 2002, the newly 
elected provincial government under 
Premier Gordon Campbell announced a 
radical policy change, completely 
deregulating post-secondary tuition in BC. 
The previous NDP government had 
maintained a tuition freeze policy from 
1996/97 to 2000/01, with an additional 
reduction of 5% in 2001/02. While tuition 
policy in Canada has undergone 
experimentation across most provinces, 
there are relatively few instances of 
governments forgoing formal regulatory 
control over prices at public colleges and 
universities (Rexe, 2011).  
Policy actors. By 2001, there were a number 
of important policy stakeholders attempting 
to influence post-secondary policy in BC, 
summarized in Table 2. The post-secondary 
system in BC had 28 public post-secondary 
institutions, with six universities, five 
university colleges, 11 colleges, five 
institutes, and one agency, the Open 
Learning Agency. These institutions were 
represented by member organizations, as 
were faculty and student interests.  
Table 2. Summary of Interest Groups in BC Policy Episode 
Interest group Resources, views, and influences 
The University President’s Council 
(TUPC) 
 
Represented the presidents of the major research universities. Goals in 
2001 were to fill the funding gap to increase access to degree programs, 
recruit and retain top quality faculty, build research, restore university 
core budgets to close the funding gap between BC universities and 
comparable institutions located elsewhere, and capital funding. 
Privately, individual presidents called for tuition deregulation as a 
method to achieve that. Influenced by internal analysis of the costs of 
the tuition freeze, feedback from key constituencies, and government 
expectations for unfunded growth. 
Advanced Education Council of 
British Columbia (AECBC) 
Represented the 22 publicly funded colleges, university colleges, and 
institutes. Established in 1990 with a multi-constituency character; 
internal conflict led to disbanding by 2002. Generally silent on tuition 
policy, but privately individual presidents called for tuition 
deregulation. Influenced by internal coalition distractions and prestige 
seeking. 
Confederation of University Faculty 
Associations of BC (CUFA) 
Represented university academic staff in its member faculty 
associations, and formally incorporated in 1982. Has tended to 
emphasize the importance of overall levels of government funding, 
preferring to see tuition fees kept as low as possible. Influenced by 
membership views and generally progressive core values. 
College and Institute Educators 
Association (CIEA) 
A voluntary federation of faculty associations formed in 1980 
representing approximately 7,000 faculty and staff in BC colleges and 
institutes. Very vocal opposition to tuition fees, and particularly to any 
fee increases, as student access was a top policy concern. Influenced by 
membership views and progressive core values. 
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The dominant coalition in this policy 
episode was that of the universities. During 
the period prior to the tuition policy change, 
the TUPC gained momentum with the 
addition of influential new university 
presidents, a renewed and well-organized 
shared approach to achieving common 
goals, and changes to the organization’s 
focus and resources dedicated to government 
relations. The universities developed strong 
common messaging, including a shared 
budget submission to government, based on 
common values (such as university 
autonomy) and common preferences on 
tuition policy, given the overall context of 
government funding and performance 
requirements.   
Antecedent tuition policy. Until the mid-
1990s, the universities enjoyed a “non-
interventionist” policy environment, with 
autonomy in setting tuition fees and 
establishing academic priorities (Dennison, 
1997). This approach changed when the 
NDP government was elected in 1991; the 
NDP campaigned with a commitment to 
education and promoted system-wide post-
secondary policy development and 
coordination. With the change in 
government, there were significant changes 
in the 1990s in BC’s post-secondary 
education system (Schuetze and Day, 2001); 
these changes included system expansion, 
institutional differentiation, and introduction 
of applied degrees (Dennison and Schuetze, 
2004). The post-secondary policy 
environment under the NDP from 1991 to 
2001 focused on goals of access and 
affordability, which became formally 
embedded in the strategic plan for the 
university college, college, and institute 
sector, Charting a New Course. There was 
no such plan for the universities; the 
universities had traditionally been 
autonomous with statutory protection, which 
insulated them from formal government 
intrusion into their affairs (Schuetze and 
Day, 2001). A key element in the NDP’s 
access and affordability platform was a 
political commitment to a tuition freeze, 
enacted through the Tax and Consumer Rate 
Freeze Act in 1996. The policy instrument of 
legislation indicated the political 
commitment of the government, which was 
renewed in both of the following five years 
and followed by one year of mandatory 
tuition reductions in 2001.  
Canadian Federation of Students – 
BC (CFS-BC) 
Represented the majority of student organizations in the BC public post-
secondary system, about 100,000 students, and 16 locals. Tuition fees 
were the priority public policy issue for the federation, with policy goal 
to maintain the tuition and fee freeze, and establish a long-term plan for 
the reduction in tuition. Influenced by membership views, national 
coalition policy-making, and progressive core values. 
Alma Mater Society – UBC (AMS) Represented approximately 37,000 students, and intermittently affiliated 
with the Canadian Alliance of Student Associations (CASA), a national 
federation. AMS-UBC adopted a policy in favour of tuition fee 
increases, limited to the rate of inflation. Influenced internally by 
changes in organizational policy preferences. 
BC Business Council (BCBC) Represented approximately 250 companies, and was reconstituted in 
1984. In the spring of 2000, recommended the removal of the tuition 
freeze. Influenced by membership views and economic development 
and competitiveness concerns. 
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In political terms, the tuition freeze 
policy was seen by to be owned by the NDP, 
led by the influence of Premier Glen Clark. 
The Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives 
termed the tuition freeze “the hallmark” of 
the NDP government’s post-secondary 
funding policy (Malcolmson and Lee, 2004); 
a student leader described the policy of 
freezing tuition fees as one of the “key, 
hallmark, defining policies of the NDP” 
(Student leader D). It was also regarded as 
politically popular; as one party ally 
reported, “it was one of the areas where the 
NDP government polled well” (Faculty 
association leader A). As a result of its 
popularity, the tuition freeze policy formed a 
central plank of the NDP platform in the 
1996 election and again in 2001. 
The tuition freeze was not popular 
with the post-secondary institutions. It was 
accompanied in many years by increased 
FTE targets that were unfunded and, as a 
result, the impact of the freeze was 
amplified. As one senior civil servant 
observed: “the institutions had been saying 
for a long time the tuition freeze was killing 
them, it was strangling them” (Senior civil 
servant A). According to accounts of several 
research participants, the institutions had 
repeatedly made representations regarding 
negative impacts of institutional financing, 
productivity expectations, and the tuition fee 
policy from the time the tuition freeze was 
enacted. In spite of an espoused access 
policy agenda, many institutions felt that 
access was being compromised by the 
financial constraints placed on institutions; 
“The institutions had occupied the field with 
information about the real implications and 
about not what it meant for them, but what it 
meant for the students in the communities 
that they served” (University organization 
official A). Institutional representations of 
the resultant issues included stories of 
increases in class sizes, capital and space 
problems on campus, inadequate teaching 
conditions, insufficient student-support 
services, and decline in accessibility of 
upper-level courses and consequent 
lengthening of time to degree completion 
and increase in student debt; “It was about 
libraries being open. It was about offering 
the courses students needed to graduate. It 
was about reducing degree completion 
times” (Student leader A). These 
representations were made by all types of 
institutions, but most notably by the 
universities:  
by ignoring all those additional inflationary 
pressures, demand pressures, cost pressures that 
had arisen as a result of policy changes, the 
implication of the tuition freeze is that institutions 
were locked in a place where they could not meet 
legitimate and rising access demands, and were 
very much at risk of not being able to sustain 
quality in a business environment where quality 
ought to be at the very heart of what they’re about. 
(University organization official A) 
In addition to general underfunding 
and its consequences, significant pressure 
was being brought to bear on the issues and 
aspirations of the professional schools and 
graduate studies at the universities. For UBC 
in particular, there was a perceived need for 
expansion of seats in medical education, and 
competition, funding, and quality issues in 
the law and business schools. Many of the 
funding and quality issues of the universities 
received significant media attention, with 
increasing coverage starting in 1999. These 
news stories focused on areas of public 
angst, particularly stories of increases in 
university GPA admission requirements. 
UBC President Martha Piper was quoted in 
the Vancouver Sun saying that stagnant 
funding was causing UBC to lose ground, 
forcing the university to increase class sizes, 
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reduce its range of offerings, fall behind in 
its library holdings, and not replace people 
who were retiring (Kane, 1999). The media 
also covered TUPC’s collective budget 
submission to government for the 2000/01 
year, which asserted a significant and 
growing cost in maintaining the tuition 
freeze and that the resultant gap in funding 
translated into higher class sizes, cancelled 
courses, and not enough spaces for qualified 
students, as well as the difficulty in 
competing with other North American 
universities in recruiting faculty. It also 
referred to lack of library and laboratory 
resources, losing trained faculty to other 
North American institutions, and longer 
degree-granting periods, calling it an 
“increasingly intolerable and unsustainable 
position.”  
Politically, the Liberals had a “very 
strong message that the NDP had 
micromanaged the broader public sector to 
its detriment” (Civil servant C), and it was 
felt that the “idea of lifting the freeze had 
great traction both in the general public and 
particularly among those who could be 
defined as our support group” (Cabinet 
Minister A). It also had the value of 
differentiating policy from the NDP, 
distancing from the previous government’s 
“adherence to redistributive policies” (Civil 
servant E); in terms of the political strategy 
of the Liberals, “part of what they were 
doing was just seeking to distance and 
overturn any key NDP policies and show 
that there was a failure” (Student leader D). 
In the 2001 campaign, the Liberal party did 
not campaign on tuition policy change, in 
contrast to the NDP’s platform commitment 
to the tuition freeze. However, it was clearly 
signaled within the policy community that 
policy change could be expected should the 
Liberals win the election.  
Overall, the BC media were also 
very supportive of change in tuition fees 
policy. In a typical example, the Vancouver 
Sun ran an editorial supporting the proposed 
deregulation: 
Victoria, in what we can only describe as 
a reasonable measure, is expected to allow 
universities to increase fees by an average of 25 
per cent for the next school year… So the issue 
isn’t to subsidize or not subsidize —it’s how to 
share the burden. With the level of subsidy so 
high, and with the personal value of an education 
so substantial and tangible, we don’t think it’s 
unfair to ask students to pony up a little more. The 
tuition freeze over the past six years has deprived 
B.C.’s universities of the resources they need to 
provide a good education, and that’s a disservice 
to both the students and the society that supports 
them. (“Given a degree’s value, tuition fees should 
rise” 2002: A10) 
Process of policy change. The BC Liberals 
were elected to an overwhelming majority 
government in 2001. Gordon Campbell was 
perceived to be a strong leader with a 
practice of centralized control of policy 
agendas and decisions (Bernier, Brownsey, 
and Howlett, 2005; Palmer, 2009). Once 
elected, members within Cabinet sought to 
reduce government regulation and red tape, 
and removing the tuition freeze was 
consistent with that overall agenda. As one 
Cabinet Minister described 
it is fair to say that the notion that tuition fees 
would be deregulated was, to a certain extent, 
consistent with the general approach that you 
could say we had. But it wasn’t so much about 
lifting the freeze on tuition as it was about 
empowering institutions to set their own 
course. (Cabinet Minister A) 
With a new government and a new 
mandate, the Liberal’s broad agenda focused 
on long-term economic improvement and 
fiscal balance, which involved stimulating 
growth and reducing spending; “they wanted 
expansion of post-secondary capacity on the 
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one hand, but on the other hand they wanted 
to restore fiscal balance” (Senior civil 
servant A).  
The week after the election and 
before being sworn in as Premier, Liberal 
Leader Gordon Campbell appointed a Fiscal 
Review Panel to conduct an independent 
review of the province’s fiscal situation, 
which concluded a structural fiscal 
imbalance required significant action; 
Deputy Minister Brenda Eaton, Deputy 
Minister to the Premier, Corporate Planning 
and Restructuring, was appointed on June 5, 
2001, to coordinate a Core Services Review 
(CSR). The necessary and intended outcome 
of the CSR was clear: any program and 
service that was deemed inappropriate or 
outside the scope of government was to be 
eliminated or phased out. Only programs 
and services considered “core” would 
continue to receive government funding, and 
the overall goal was interpreted to be 
deregulation, privatization, and 
decentralization (Vakil, 2009). The post-
secondary system contribution to the review 
was uneven. Many advocacy groups in the 
post-secondary system viewed the CSR as a 
politically motivated process to eliminate 
programs that were ideologically 
inconsistent with the new governing party; 
its purpose was seen to be “gutting core 
services, getting rid of things they didn’t 
think were necessary” (Faculty association 
leader A). They feared the preference for 
smaller government and fewer regulatory 
mechanisms, and protested the need for the 
review. The universities, through TUPC, 
made a strong case linking the educational 
and research mandate of universities and the 
new government’s core objectives.  
In its submission to the Core 
Services Review, TUPC set out five 
objectives: to establish BC as a national 
leader in the awarding degrees; to bring 
national research and development funding 
to BC; to resolve the outstanding investment 
gap between BC universities and the sixteen 
most comparable universities located 
elsewhere in Canada by 2003/04; to recruit 
and retain the world-class faculty; and to 
establish and maintain necessary capital and 
technological infrastructure (TUPC, 2001: 
2). Further, the TUPC submission suggested 
that one of these regulations, the tuition 
freeze, in combination with insufficient 
government funding, had led to significant 
challenges to BC universities, including 
having a direct impact on the availability of 
courses, university admissions, time to 
degree completion, student/faculty ratios, 
student supports and services. The 
submission spoke specifically to issues of 
government regulation: 
Universities in British Columbia have been 
unreasonably constrained by government policy on 
several fronts and have been subject to excess 
regulation resulting in intrusion upon the roles and 
responsibilities of our governance structures. We 
want to work with the provincial government to 
change, eliminate or reduce these barriers. (TUPC, 
2001: 1) 
The result of the Core Services 
Review—or at least consistent with the spirit 
of the review, and as a result of the issues 
being directed to Cabinet—was that there 
were significant changes in the approach 
government took to post-secondary 
education. On tuition policy, the CSR 
recommended, “major strategic changes 
need to be made around tuition. This is a 
matter for Cabinet” (Senior civil servant G). 
In advance of the Cabinet taking the final 
decision on tuition policy, on October 18, 
2001, Minister Bond announced stakeholder 
consultations “to receive their views on the 
fiscal impact of the extended fee freeze” 
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(personal communication, March 27, 2012). 
The government met with a mix of invited 
student representatives, some with quite 
favourable views of tuition policy change. 
The CFS-BC representatives were shocked 
to find other student representatives at the 
table, after many years of exclusive 
representation of student interests at 
provincial policy consultations. There were 
strong criticisms that the meetings were 
highly orchestrated events, designed merely 
to soften up the inevitable policy 
announcement of tuition increases; “it was 
definitely a very managed process” (Student 
leader A). Both faculty and student unions 
had demonstrated little ability to exert 
influence over policy decisions with the new 
government.  
It is reported that briefing notes with 
different policy alternatives on how to make 
the “tuition freeze less constraining and 
more efficient…went back to Cabinet then 
three times” (Senior civil servant G). Within 
government, the level of consensus about 
lifting the tuition freeze was relatively high; 
the institutions were friendly to policy 
change, having lobbied so actively for so 
long, and there were few alternatives given 
the financial constraints and need for 
increased seats. Tuition was the identified 
policy lever to support these goals. The 
cabinet leadership on the policy was strong 
and centralized leadership under the 
Premier, as was typically the case. There 
was sufficient support for the decision to 
deregulate tuition fees entirely rather than 
set a format for controlled increases. On 
February 11, 2002, Minister Bond 
announced the tuition policy change, framed 
in terms of new policy support of 
institutional autonomy. 
Case of Manitoba 
Manitoba had a relatively small post-
secondary system at the time of the policy 
episode, including seven public post-
secondary institutions. The University of 
Manitoba was established in 1877, with a 
federation of several denominational 
colleges. In 1967, Manitoba expanded the 
one university system to three major 
universities: the University of Manitoba, 
focusing on a broad array of undergraduate, 
graduate, and professional education; 
Brandon University in western Manitoba; 
and the University of Winnipeg, focusing on 
general undergraduate education, as well as 
one special-purpose French-language 
institution, the Université de Saint-Boniface 
(Smith, 2011). The legacy of the one 
university system policy was that the 
University of Manitoba remained the centre 
for professional and graduate studies within 
the province for many years (Gregor, 1995). 
The province’s original technical-training 
institutes became consolidated as institutions 
in the community college system in 1969, 
including Red River College, Assiniboine 
Community College, and Keewatin 
Community College, which became the 
University College of the North in 2004. 
These institutions were operated directly by 
the government, until the introduction of the 
1993 Colleges Act, which established 
independent board governance (Gregor, 
1995).  
By 2009, there were a number of 
important policy stakeholders attempting to 
influence post-secondary policy in the 
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Table 3. Summary of Interest Groups in Manitoba Policy Episode 
Within the civil service, the Council 
on Post-Secondary Education (COPSE) was 
the crown agency accountable to the 
Minister with authorities for accountability 
requirements, program approval, credit 
transfer and articulation, allocation of funds 
to the province’s seven public post-
secondary institutions, and a range of policy-
related authorities, including tuition 
regulation. Within the Premier’s office, the 
Policy Management Secretariat was seen to 
be central and highly influential, and 
primarily served the Premier’s policy 
agenda; it was responsible for issues 
Interest group 
 
Resources, views, and influences 
 
Public institutions 
The primary actors were the three presidents of the public universities, and to a 
lesser extent, the college presidents. Emphasized institutional underfunding, the 
negative impacts of constraints on tuition fee revenue, and the failure of the 
tuition freeze as social policy. Options included setting tuition at the national 
average; use of a HEPI to set annual changes. Institutional autonomy was a key 
value. Influenced by financial, competitive, and performance pressures from key 
constituencies.  
Manitoba Organization of 
Faculty Associations 
(MOFA) 
Represented approximately 1,850 academic staff at the four universities, and 
affiliated with CAUT. Favoured low tuition, and had previously endorsed a 
tuition freeze, but that position had shifted over time. Tuition fee policy was not a 
top priority, with more focus on securing appropriate public funding. Influenced 
by membership views and generally progressive values. 
Canadian Federation of 
Students – MB (CFS-MB) 
Represented 42,000 students in the public post-secondary system, including the 
university students. Tuition fees were the priority public policy issue for the 
federation, with a policy goal to maintain the tuition freeze. Influenced by 
membership views, national coalition policy-making, and core progressive values. 
Manitoba Federation of 
Labour (MFL) 
Chartered by the Canadian Labour Congress in 1956 to represent the interests of 
CLC affiliated unions in Manitoba, with a combined membership of 95,000 
workers in private and public sectors. At the 2008 NDP convention, members of 
the MFL voted against the continuation of the tuition freeze as constrained 
institutional funding was affecting members’ working conditions. Influenced by 
membership views and bargaining conditions, and progressive values. 
Business Council of 
Manitoba (BCM) 
Formed in 1998, consisted of 65 CEOs of Manitoba companies. Had a negative 
view of tuition freeze; preferred shared investment between students and 
government, and competitive institutions. Concerned about educational quality. 
Influenced by membership views and economic development concerns. 
Winnipeg Chamber of 
Commerce (WCC) 
Incorporated in 1873, with over 2,000 members in 2008. Goal was to initiate and 
effect change in government policy and practices to support a growing and 
thriving business community Against the tuition freeze and in favour of high 
tuition/high aid solutions. Concerned about educational quality. Influenced by 
membership views and economic development concerns. 
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management and longer term overall 
strategy and was staffed by senior “political 
staff appointments that support public policy 
development from the political lens” (Senior 
civil servant M). A challenge with the 
intermediary agency was the tension 
between Council and government, as there 
was “always a degree of friction between the 
government and the Council” (Senior civil 
servant L). In practice, the tuition question 
had “always sat at the centre of government 
here, not with COPSE” (Elected official B). 
The role of COPSE to provide analysis on 
budget and planning for institutions, given 
policy parameters set by government, was 
advisory only; in truth, the Minister “has the 
ability to do anything he or she feels like 
doing in the best interests of the province” 
(Elected official B).  
Antecedent policy: Until the late 1990s, 
higher education was not a typical or 
significant political issue in the province 
(Jones, 1996). However, this political 
environment changed significantly by that 
time; “if Manitoba’s post-secondary system 
between 1967 and 1997 was characterized 
by stability, the system since 1997 has been 
characterized by considerable structural 
change” (Smith, 2011: 52). In this period, 
issues of post-secondary access and 
affordability emerged as key political issues 
for the provincial government. After 11 
years of Progressive Conservative 
government, the NDP were elected in the 
1999 general election. At that time, post-
secondary participation rates were of 
particular concern, as was both post-
secondary affordability and accessibility, in 
light of increasing tuition fees (Saunders, 
2006). The NDP’s 1999 election platform 
included an election commitment to freeze 
tuition, both as a commitment to make post-
secondary education “more accessible and 
more affordable” (Senior civil servant M) 
and as an electoral strategy. In addition to 
political strategy, there were serious 
concerns about post-secondary accessibility; 
there was “a genuine commitment to 
ensuring that there were opportunities for 
education…that that access was not limited 
to certain socioeconomic strata” (Senior 
civil servant O). 
In other words, in both coalition 
politics and to the public, freezing tuition 
was seen to be “one way to send a signal on 
affordability for students” (Cabinet Minister 
D). As an electoral strategy, the tuition 
freeze was seen to be one of the NDP’s main 
planks in the election campaign (Kuxhaus, 
2007), an election that afforded the NDP the 
opportunity to re-establish their social 
democratic image (Netherton, 2001). The 
tuition freeze had the advantage of being 
well understood by voters; “tuition freeze is 
a good bullet” (Senior civil servant O). This 
success in policy communication was 
important to the campaign; “the language of 
a freeze of course is very definitive, clear, as 
they would say in British Labour; crunchy 
language. It’s very tangible…that’s worth 
quite a bit in retail politics” (Cabinet 
Minister D). The Winnipeg Free Press 
described the tuition freeze as a “powerful 
political gambit” (“No to educare”, 2007, 
A12). In political terms, there was a sense 
that “the government, politically, the NDP, 
owned the issue of tuition” (Senior civil 
servant P); the tuition freeze had become 
“part of the government’s brand” (Cabinet 
Minister D). More important, beyond a 
cornerstone policy, for many in the NDP the 
importance of the tuition freeze became a 
political “article of faith” (Senior civil 
servant L). 
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While the original political 
commitment to the tuition freeze policy 
remained in place, government accepted 
some incremental changes to tuition fee 
levels, changes characterized as “safety 
valves” (Cabinet Minister D). These 
incremental changes began in 2003 and 
arose as concessions to institutions, based 
primarily upon representations from 
universities with professional schools. 
Further, ancillary fees and international-
student tuition fees were not regulated under 
the tuition freeze. During this time, COPSE 
had an interest in policy change, and in 
particular, for a less political and more 
sustainable policy for institutional financing. 
The university representations were met 
with some sympathy; “the issue had been 
raised about the need or the desire on the 
part of department bureaucrats to lift that 
freeze” (Senior civil servant M). On tuition 
policy options, COPSE was “alive to the fact 
that the institutions need resources” and had 
put forward, “fairly consistently, options to 
get out of the freeze” as “the revenue issues 
at universities have a deleterious impact on 
quality at universities and colleges” (Senior 
civil servant Q). The Council had an 
increasing interest in depoliticizing the 
tuition policy decisions and developing an 
improved framework of principles or 
guidelines for decision-making in cases of 
appeal for tuition rate changes: 
after we started getting a bevy of professional 
school applications for higher tuitions than might 
otherwise exist for regular arts and science 
students, that really we needed to start trying to 
depoliticize the tuition question and try to develop 
a principle-based approach to it…And I think we 
actually could have worked on those principles a 
little bit more and tried to depoliticize the 
question. Because it had become…such a political 
question. (Elected official B) 
At the center of the tuition freeze 
debate was the question of its effectiveness 
as social policy in promoting access; in this 
light, the tuition freeze was characterized as 
a failure. The Winnipeg Free Press regularly 
made calls for the elimination of the freeze, 
suggesting that it had not made education 
any more accessible (see “Freezes failing”, 
2007, February 15), a position shared by 
comments from both universities and 
research enterprises. In a particularly 
forceful editorial, the Winnipeg Free Press 
characterized the tuition freeze as the NDP’s 
“failed nine-year experiment in ‘educare’ 
and central planning” and called for “ending 
the muddle-headed thinking that has 
weakened the province’s post-secondary 
institutions, while providing none of the 
intended benefits” (“Failed experiment”, 
2008, April 2, A12). 
There were two major shifts in the 
progressive coalition prior to the policy 
change. First, prior to the 2000s, the 
Manitoba Organization of Faculty 
Associations (MOFA) and the CFS-MB 
generally had a high degree of cooperation 
and coordination of interests on post-
secondary funding, with expressed similar 
general policy views on affordability and 
access and underlying values of the nature of 
public education. Coordination with the 
CFS-MB typically focused on these views, 
and there had been an understanding that 
faculty associations at most of the 
institutions did not “speak against” the 
student movement, a “political entente” 
(Senior civil servant O). During the period 
prior to the policy change, the established 
position of MOFA on tuition fee policy 
shifted, from firm to less support; “the 
position on that by the Manitoba 
Organization of Faculty Associations 
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became much more muddy [and]… actually 
at some point supported tuition increases” 
(Faculty association leader D). Second, a 
significant change occurred leading up to 
and during the NDP convention in 2008. 
Organized labour had been a significant 
early supporter of the tuition freeze policy; 
“for the first part of the Manitoba NDP 
government, [labour] was one of the big 
backers and pushers of the tuition freeze” 
(Student leader I). During that time, 
organized labour was a confirmed ally of the 
CFS-MB and the NDP, and the tuition 
freeze position was considered “a coalition 
politics issue” (Senior civil servant O). 
However, over time some labour leaders saw 
a negative impact of the tuition freeze on 
their membership; a position paper was 
written and a “couple of Labour leaders 
supported coming off of the tuition freeze” 
(Cabinet Minister D). This position was 
directly related to the financial well-being of 
institutions and their employees: “Labour 
saw the impact in terms of their 
membership, in terms of whether it was 
university staff or physical plant staff or 
whatever, that the salaries of their members 
were being impacted by the overall financial 
health and sustainability of the policy” 
(Senior civil servant O). 
Given the previous solidarity on the 
policy, the student leaders found this to be a 
“shocking position for labour to take” 
(Student leader I). By many accounts, this 
was the first occasion when labour was “at 
distance from the student movement on that 
policy” (Senior civil servant O). These 
tensions manifested in a specific incident on 
the floor of the NDP convention, in which 
the youth representatives reportedly lost the 
vote by a narrow margin “because of the 
labour delegates” (Student leader I). This 
schism within the coalition had a few fault 
lines. First, the fracture on the convention 
floor indicated CFS-MB’s alienation from 
labour; the students appeared to fail to 
understand the policy impacts, or “what the 
policy meant in a larger picture and not just 
an individual pocketbook type of 
perspective…the students made a fatal error 
by not understanding what it meant for 
labour” (Senior civil servant O). Second, 
youth delegates at the convention appeared 
to be divided. The proposed change to 
tuition policy saw a “split” in both 
organizations and within “fractured” the 
overall younger convention participants 
(Student leader I); the Young New 
Democrats “didn’t feel as strongly about it 
as the people who were part of the 
Federation of Students. So there were sort of 
varying degrees of objection [to the 
motion]” (Cabinet Minister D). 
Process of policy change: In January 2007, 
an op-ed titled, “NDP’s tuition freeze is 
downgrading value of education” written by 
James Blatz of the Department of Civil 
Engineering at the University of Manitoba 
was published in the Winnipeg Free Press. 
He outlined how the number of elective 
courses offered by the Faculty of 
Engineering had steadily declined, 
negatively impacting the quality of 
programming compared to other 
universities. The article placed the blame on 
the tuition freeze policy, arguing that since 
1999 it had steadily weakened the 
competitive position of Manitoba’s 
universities, both nationally and 
internationally, and threatened the ability of 
the university to provide enough engineers 
for the province (Blatz, 2007, B4). Further 
concerns arose that the engineering 
program’s professional accreditation might 
be downgraded by the national body that 
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inspects engineering programs across 
Canada, the Canadian Engineering 
Accreditation Board (Welch, 2007, February 
8); it was reported that Manitoba’s largest 
university was “so stretched for cash” that 
the engineering faculty’s accreditation could 
be jeopardized (“No to educare”, 2007, 
A12). 
In response to the financial and 
accreditation crisis, in March 2007 the 
University of Manitoba engineering students 
voted by referendum to increase fees for 
engineering courses from $104 per credit 
hour to $144, specifically to address aging 
laboratories, insufficient equipment, and the 
number of teaching assistants. The Winnipeg 
Free Press ran an editorial on March 9, 
2007, calling on the Minister to “butt out” 
and remove the number of “hurdles” and 
“meddlesome conditions” in the way of the 
students’ bid to raise money for their faculty 
(“With respect, butt out”, 2007, A10). By 
June, the proposed engineering fees were 
approved by COPSE and the Minister, in 
part due to the students’ overwhelming 
support for them (“Students hike their own 
fees”, 2007). The engineering accreditation 
crisis and subsequent student fee referendum 
both signaled and facilitated a turning point 
and a change in mood around the tuition 
freeze policy; “there was a growing sense 
that something had to be done” (Senior civil 
servant Q). Within government quarters, 
attention was focused as a result; “it had 
been on some people’s agenda for some 
time, and I think it was just finally 
recognized that to maintain it further would 
have negative impacts on the system” 
(Senior civil servant O). 
Heading into a spring general 
election in 2007, the NDP’s overall 
popularity was down; the public mood was 
described as “a little bit restless” and the 
government was “on the defensive” 
(“They’ve got fever”, 2007, A11). During 
the election, the NDP carefully controlled its 
messaging on a tuition freeze commitment, 
with the overall intention of avoiding a 
platform promise. The NDP was sensitive to 
criticisms that they were “failing 
Manitobans and the university sector” and 
did not want the tuition freeze policy to 
become “the defining issue of the election” 
(Student leader I). Despite the public mood, 
“post-secondary education didn’t get a 
whole lot of play” (Senior civil servant M) 
and on May 22, 2007, the election returned 
the NDP to a third consecutive majority. 
During the development of the first 
budget after the election, 2008/09, the 
universities forecasted major budget 
problems and called for major funding 
increases to maintain programs under the 
continued tuition freeze. In preliminary 
forecasts filed with COPSE, the University 
of Manitoba asked for a 10.7 per cent 
operating grant increase of $25.4 million, 
and Brandon University for 10 per cent, or 
$2.6 million more (Martin, 2007, October 
1); further, it was revealed that the 
University of Manitoba had accumulated 
$211 million of deferred maintenance (Doer, 
2007, November 28). By this time “revenues 
started to tank” (Senior civil servant L) and 
the economic recession started to directly 
influence government planning: “there was 
that realization that they couldn’t continue 
indefinitely with the tuition freeze, so it was 
part of an overall look at the financial 
climate” (Senior civil servant M). Within 
government, there was a change in attention 
on tuition policy; “there was a growing 
sense that there needed to be some more 
revenue generated through tuition. Also, 10 
years is a long time so there was a sense that 
it was time for that kind of change” (Senior 
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civil servant Q). The fiscal pressure on 
government was increasing, as was the 
pressing need to fill the gap between 
revenue and expenses in post-secondary 
education. Members of the civil service had 
long held a skeptical view of the tuition 
freeze and were supportive of the changing 
climate; “lots of people in the bureaucracy 
knew that that was bad public policy” 
(Senior university administrator C). While 
there was a lack of consensus within both 
Cabinet and the NDP caucus, there had been 
a gradual shift in many MLAs’ commitment 
to the tuition freeze: 
There wasn’t a sudden turning point or conversion 
on the issue. I think Cabinet always recognized 
that you need to switch to a different kind of 
policy at some point. There was several years of 
debate whether this was the time, and obviously 
the answer had been no in those years. And then 
finally it was just thought this is now [the time] to 
come off it and start to allow some modest 
increases…It was just the time to move off it. 
(Cabinet Minister D) 
Prior to a formal government 
announcement, there were two different 
media stories that foreshadowed policy 
change, provoking stakeholder responses. 
The first signal was a newspaper article in 
December 2007, in which the immutability 
of the tuition freeze policy was called into 
question (Welch, 2007, December 30, A1), 
and the second speculated on government 
plans to allow tuition fee increases at 
colleges and universities beginning in fall 
2009, published the day before the planned 
budget speech, (Martin, 2008, April 1, A3). 
This second story caught many off guard, 
including the student unions; some were 
unconvinced that the government was 
seriously considering an increase (Martin, 
2008, April 1, A3) and others felt that the 
idea was leaked to the press to “engage 
feedback” or “float” the idea to gauge 
student reaction (Student leader I). The CFS-
MB reacted to the April 1, 2008, news report 
by mobilizing its members and put pressure 
on the provincial government to delay, and 
extend the freeze for a year. Key to this 
pressure was the matter of interpreting 
campaign promises from the 2007 election. 
The CFS-MB found a campaign brochure 
from NDP MLA Sharon Blady describing 
“extending the tuition freeze” as a party 
priority (Martin, 2008, April 2, A4) and 
subsequently criticized the government for 
“engaging in some fancy footwork” (Jacks, 
2008, B4). Within the party itself, the Young 
New Democrats responded with pressure; a 
representative wrote a letter of 
congratulations to the government on “eight 
successful years of a tuition freeze”, and 
looking forward “to the continued priority of 
affordable post-secondary education in 
Manitoba” (“Have your say”, 2008, April 5, 
A16). University interests including 
President Szathmary and Terry Hidichuk, 
Chair, Board of Regents of the University of 
Winnipeg, reiterated their observation there 
was no election promise of an indefinite 
tuition freeze. The Winnipeg Free Press 
wrote in favour of the policy change 
(“Failed experiment”, 2008, April 2) and the 
Certified General Accountants Association 
of Manitoba reported a positive calculation 
for the net cost of education to Manitoba 
students, even with tuition unfreezing 
(Martin, 2008, April 3).  
The government quickly backed 
away from the anticipated schedule for 
policy change generating further 
speculation. With the budget announcements 
on April 7, 2008, Minister McGifford 
announced that the tuition freeze was 
extended for the 2008/09 budget year while 
allowing tuition to gradually return to 1999 
levels beginning the following year. In order 
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to accommodate the extension of the tuition 
freeze, operating grants to universities and 
colleges were increased. Minister McGifford 
said it was the desire to give students a 
transition year, rather than a fear of student 
protests or the negative optics of breaking an 
election promise, which prompted the 
delayed implementation of the tuition thaw 
by a year (Welch and Martin, 2008). Others 
thought it was the effect of the CFS-MB; 
James A. Blatz observed in the Winnipeg 
Free Press on April 13, 2008: “Political 
posturing and ‘optics’ have again taken 
precedence over sustainability and good 
governance. Has the provincial government 
been bullied by student activists into 
arbitrarily maintaining the current tuition 
freeze policy for yet another year?” (Welch 
and Martin, 2008, April 8l, A4). However, 
many in the policy community attributed the 
delay to the pressure of the Young New 
Democrats rather than the CFS-MB; they 
were “strong advocates for not lifting the 
freeze, and so they were a strong voice that 
ultimately I believe delayed that one year” 
(Senior civil servant M). The Young New 
Democrats held some authority within the 
party given their contributions to the 
elections; they “worked as party staffers, 
who worked in the constituency offices, who 
were the ones who won a bunch of the seats 
for them because they worked so hard on his 
campaigns” (Student leader I). 
In the same announcement on April 
7, 2008, Minister McGifford also announced 
a one-person commission to review the 
province’s policy on affordability, 
accessibility, and excellence. In announcing 
the Commission on Tuition Fees and 
Accessibility to Post-Secondary Education, 
the Minister noted that this work was part of 
the government’s desire and commitment to 
“ensure post-secondary education in 
Manitoba is accessible and affordable” and 
its scope was to review the province’s policy 
on affordability and accessibility, and on the 
relationship between tuition fees, student 
aid, and accessibility to post-secondary 
education in Manitoba. Overseen by the 
Ministry of Advanced Education and 
Literacy, Dr. Benjamin Levin was appointed 
commissioner on July 28, 2008. The official 
terms of reference for the Commission were 
established by government, and provided a 
clear and limited mandate, focusing on 
accessibility; the Commission was not a 
general inquiry into post-secondary 
education, its operations, governance, or 
financing (Levin, 2009: iv). The 
Commissioner’s primary focus was the 
question of accessibility, not tuition policy 
per se, and the approach emphasized public 
stakeholder engagement over lobbying. The 
consultations were facilitated in several 
formal events in September 2008. The CFS-
MB was highly critical of the management 
of the process, from the stakeholders invited 
to the lack of public hearings. 
The report was submitted March 31, 
2009, and released to the public on April 2, 
2009. After receiving the report, government 
officials met with representatives of primary 
stakeholder groups, including university 
administrations and students, to discuss 
tuition fee policy and future access 
initiatives. In the final report, the 
Commission was careful to respond to the 
policy arguments in favour of a free- or low-
tuition policy. On tuition policy specifically, 
the Commission argued that students ought 
to pay a share of the cost of their post-
secondary education, as individuals reap 
large benefits from post-secondary 
education: “there is no justification for this 
personal benefit to be subsidized completely 
given the many other pressures on public 
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expenditure…While current levels are 
arbitrary, there is no compelling reason to 
move to a very different fee structure” 
(Levin, 2009: v). As a result, the 
Commission recommended that Manitoba 
should allow moderate tuition increases. 
With a continued divided caucus and 
some outspoken divisions within Cabinet, 
Premier Doer had made the decision to 
implement tuition policy change, with the 
understanding that “it was time for this to 
happen” (Senior civil servant M). The 
regulated nature of the decision was 
important, as a serious concern of policy-
makers was to introduce more revenue to 
institutions without creating adverse 
conditions for students and for future 
political success. The capped increase 
approach was the compromise position that 
prevailed within Cabinet; “we were worried 
about the signal [tuition policy change] 
would send for all the same reasons that we 
introduced [the freeze]…we eventually 
decided we would come off the freeze but 
we would essentially move into a regulated 
environment” (Cabinet Minister D). On 
Wednesday, April 22, 2009, Minister 
McGifford announced a 4.5 per cent 
increase in tuition fees at universities, and a 
$100 tuition increase at Manitoba’s colleges; 
even with these increases, Manitoba’s 
tuition fees were to remain far below those 
in neighbouring provincial jurisdictions and 
well below Canadian averages.  
Analysis of change factors in Manitoba: 
Within the MSM framework a number of 
factors can be identified. In the policy 
stream there were well-organized policy 
entrepreneurs from the universities and 
business interests, with a clear policy 
options to address the financial conditions of 
institutions, and internal to the government 
there were policy entrepreneurs interested in 
finding a more effective policy to achieve 
educational participation goals. In the 
problem stream, there was increasing 
lobbying and pressure arising from 
incremental policy decisions, revenue 
constraints in institutions, a changing fiscal 
climate for government, and the engineering 
accreditation problem at the University of 
Manitoba, which brought public attention to 
and business community comment on the 
problems of educational quality and 
competitiveness. In the politics stream, the 
government was secure in its new mandate 
with political capital in post-secondary 
education based on a history of popular 
policy decisions, and there was growing 
public awareness that the cost of post-
secondary education was out of step with 
expectations and other provinces, and public 
receptivity to change. The Commission 
acted as the catalytic event that created the 
final policy window, and established the 
research basis for tuition policy change. 
Using the ACF lens, the break between the 
leaders of the Manitoba Federation of 
Labour and the CFS-MB had a significant 
effect on the policy episode. This break 
signified the degree of difference in beliefs, 
priorities, and perceptions in what was 
formerly seen to be a solid coalition, within 
groups and between groups, significant 
enough to cause a break, taking precedent 
over previous coalition agreements. 
Discussion and cross-case analysis 
Goals: In both cases, government officials 
represented the same overall policy goal: the 
provision of quality and accessible post-
secondary education. The political actors 
appear to agree on the notion of educational 
quality, which can be inferred through the 
various indicators the governments used to 
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monitor the policy area in these cases. These 
include a wide range of indicators of student 
and institutional performance, including 
teaching and learning conditions. On the 
matter of accessibility, however, the 
expressed policy goal carried slightly 
different connotations in terms of problem 
definition and desired action. Post-secondary 
accessibility can be defined in a number of 
ways, including the capacity available in an 
institution, a program, or a system; the 
degree to which institutions behave 
selectively or receptively; geographical 
proximity to educational opportunities; or in 
different measures of affordability for 
students. This overall policy goal, with its 
different connotations, was a successful 
choice for framing and interpreting political 
problems and policy alternatives (Cobb and 
Ross, 1997).  
In BC, the government’s public 
representation of the goal of policy change 
was to provide improved financial resources 
to the post-secondary education system 
within the financial constraints of the new 
provincial budget, an environment that 
required reductions in government spending 
and increasingly unfunded inflationary 
pressure within institutions. There was a 
desire to increase both post-secondary 
capacity and post-secondary participation to 
serve economic and human capital 
development agendas, as well as to address 
institutional problems resulting from the 
“hidden costs” (Civil servant B) of the 
tuition freeze, including decreased student 
access, increased waiting lists, and reduced 
course availability. Further, there was a 
political interest in solving the political 
problem of access to university seats, which 
“popped up in response to the increasing 
public pressure about not being able to get 
into particular institutions in the Lower 
Mainland” (Civil servant C). This political 
issue eventually landed on the agenda of the 
Cabinet and the Premier. One Cabinet 
Minister reported that his constituents felt 
the tuition freeze policy was driving 
admissions thresholds “to levels that were 
causing lots of public angst” (Cabinet 
Minister A). It has been reported that the 
Premier himself expressed frustration to his 
colleagues about the increasingly high GPA 
threshold for admission into UBC, which 
had started to become a political problem 
because “nobody can get into UBC with a B 
anymore” (Civil servant C). In response to 
these pressures, tuition policy change was 
considered to accomplish both policy and 
political goals. 
In Manitoba, the primary goal of 
government for the tuition policy change 
was to provide post-secondary institutions 
needed financial resources to ensure 
accessibility and quality education, in the 
context of constrained government finances. 
The purpose of the policy change was 
therefore financial; it was intended to “give 
some relief to the institutions” (Cabinet 
Minister D) or “put the financials of the 
institutions in better order” (Senior civil 
servant O). However, this financial reform 
was undertaken only with an understanding 
that it would redirect policy efforts to 
continue to support post-secondary 
accessibility: 
I think in the government of the day’s mind, this 
was not actually a move away from access or from 
fairness to students or from a commitment actually 
to students. It was an adjustment to be more 
refined in terms of having resources better targeted 
to those who needed it most and to at the same 
time find a way to ensure more fiscal sustainability 
for the institutions in the long run and so, in that 
way, to make a better linkage policy-wise between 
ensuring that access and excellence were mutually 
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reinforcing and not mutually competing objectives. 
(Senior civil servant O) 
In BC, the framing and focus of the 
policy goal was capacity in the system and 
reduction of excessive selectivity for 
admission to the research universities; the 
language of accessibility was used to 
describe financial issues faced by 
institutions, and therefore raised questions of 
capacity, rather than issues faced by 
individuals. Further, economic development 
goals were directly informing post-
secondary policy, a relationship found 
elsewhere in Canada (Lang et al., 2000). In 
Manitoba, where accessibility had 
previously been framed primarily in terms of 
a low tuition strategy, accessibility was 
reviewed in light of the technical 
information on student transitions and 
financial aid.  
Coalition stability and change. The stability 
of policy coalitions is a key element of the 
ACF; policy change can arise from shocks 
internal to coalitions, or from external 
shocks to coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1993). Both of the two cases of 
policy change illustrate a policy 
environment in which multiple active 
networks of organized interests coordinate 
activity, and in each case, these networks 
experienced significant internal and external 
shocks. This study found that changes in 
student coalitions are associated with tuition 
policy change. The student movement was 
somewhat unstable in both provinces, and 
nationally. In BC, the student coalition, 
while growing in strength in terms of 
membership and financial resources, had 
internal divisions and suffered from internal 
lack of focus. This attention shift within the 
student coalition, in combination with the 
relative disarray of the other politically 
progressive organized interests, including 
the NDP, contributed to an atmosphere 
where the coalitions of overall progressive 
interests had been significantly weakened. In 
Manitoba, the one significant shock was the 
break between the leaders of the Manitoba 
Federation of Labour and the CFS-MB as a 
result of insufficient coordination between 
coalition members and diverging policy 
goals; these diverging goals proved 
significant enough to cause a break, taking 
precedent over previous coalition 
agreements. 
Softening up. These cases show a range of 
agreement by decision-makers on tuition 
policy. In BC, within government there was 
a relatively high degree of consensus on the 
expressed goal, however, there were some 
divisions in Cabinet about the degree to 
which tuition should be deregulated. In 
Manitoba the Cabinet and caucus were 
divided; there was a high level of agreement 
on the problem, but little consensus on the 
policy decision to remove the tuition freeze. 
In two jurisdictions, a lack of consensus 
within Cabinet or government caucuses 
seems to have posed only a moderate impact 
on the process of tuition policy change; the 
lack of consensus appears to have triggered 
additional policy analysis prior to policy 
change. This additional analysis served the 
purpose of socializing legislators to the 
conflict (Schattschneider, 1960), an 
important aspect of softening up. Softening 
up processes (Kingdon, 2003) are evident 
and important in these cases of policy 
change. In BC, the government appointed 
and conducted in rapid succession a fiscal 
review, a core services review to examine all 
government programs and agencies, a 
budgeting and planning exercise, and a 
consultation on tuition policy, which served 
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to signal policy change and diffuse 
opposition. In Manitoba, the leaked story in 
the press served as a trial balloon, and 
having gauged public and coalition partners’ 
reactions, government arranged for a 
commission to establish the rationale for 
policy change and socialize the new policy 
with those interests, including inside the 
party caucus. The establishment of the 
Manitoba commission was an institutional 
response, intended to bring objective 
evidence into a values-informed policy 
analysis, and satisfy the policy community 
that satisfactory consideration had been 
made on both questions. This was important, 
as for many in the caucus and in the party, 
accessibility was an important value as well 
as a policy goal, and future electoral success 
was an important consideration. This 
process is a widely used symbolic strategy 
that publicly accepts the reasonableness of a 
debate while it avoids immediate 
commitment; governments choose 
commissions as they can serve to broaden 
the base of political support and legitimate 
concerns (Cobb and Ross, 1997). The choice 
of commission is consistent with the role of 
policy broker; for Weible and Sabatier 
(2005), policy brokers often mediate 
between advocacy coalitions engaged in 
intense political conflict. Policy brokers 
“seek to find reasonable compromise among 
hostile coalitions” (Weible and Sabatier, 
2005: 128); politicians, civil servants or 
courts can assume this role.  
Conclusion 
 This research found that each of the 
conceptual frameworks contributed unique 
and useful insights into factors influencing 
policy change. The MSM provides a helpful 
structure with which to develop and analyze 
accounts of policy dynamics. Given the 
ways in which the policy window is 
contingent upon the convergent of the three 
streams, in these cases it was particularly 
helpful to focus on the decision to change 
policy as the unit of analysis as a technique 
to focus in on the dynamics of decision-
making. In both of the cases in this study, 
the MSM provides a very strong framework 
for describing conditions of policy change. 
In BC, in the policy stream were several 
powerful and well-organized policy 
entrepreneurs with a clear agenda-setting, 
framing, and policy options, including a 
preferred option, and the government 
engaged in several softening up activities. In 
the problem stream, there were a number of 
highly salient issues within institutions, the 
post-secondary system, the business 
community, and the media, which were 
successfully framed as negative 
consequences of the tuition freeze. In the 
politics stream, the public mood shifted 
against the NDP and its policies, and the 
change in government provided the 
opportunity for policy change, given that the 
newly elected Liberal government received a 
resounding mandate for change. In 
Manitoba, in the policy stream there were 
well-organized policy entrepreneurs from 
the universities and business interests, with a 
clear policy options to address the financial 
conditions of institutions, and internal to the 
government there were policy entrepreneurs 
interested in finding a more effective policy 
to achieve educational participation goals. In 
the policy stream, the government engaged 
in a significant softening up activity by 
establishing a commission to undertake 
policy analysis and recommendations. In the 
problem stream, there was increasing 
lobbying and pressure arising from 
incremental policy decisions, revenue 
constraints in institutions, a changing fiscal 
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climate for government, and a few focusing 
events which brought public attention to and 
business community comment on the 
problems of educational quality and 
competitiveness. In the politics stream, the 
government was securely in its new mandate 
with political capital in post-secondary 
education based on a history of popular 
policy decisions, and there was growing 
public awareness that the cost of post-
secondary education was out of step with 
expectations and other provinces, and public 
receptivity to change. The commission acted 
as the catalytic event that created the policy 
window, and established the basis for tuition  
policy change.   
Further, the ACF provides an 
important, highly detailed conceptual lens to 
examine the specific dynamics of external 
shocks and internal subsystem conditions 
which result in policy change. Both of the 
cases of policy change in this study reflect 
the conceptual expectations of the ACF; that 
coalitions would experience significant 
internal and external shocks in the 10 year 
period prior to the policy change, as well as 
power and structural shifts or significant 
changes in the policy environment. In this 
regard, the ACF provides important and 
relevant conceptual insight into dynamics of 
policy change.  
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Analytical Framework  
Dimensio
n 






1.1.1 What were the expressed goals of the policy?  
1.1.2 Was there consensus on the goal?  
1.1.3 How was the problem defined? 
1.1.4 What indicators were used to identify and describe the policy 
problem(s)? 






1.2.1 Who were the policy actors?  
1.2.2 Did policy actors have explicit goals toward which their activities 
were aligned? 
1.2.3 What influenced the policy actors’ policy preference?  
1.2.4 To what extent were policy actors representing political party 
platforms? 
1.2.5 Which issues were linked by policy actors to tuition policy? 
1.2.6 What events or activities contributed to the problem being 
identified?  
1.2.7 What is the temporal sequence of actor behaviour and events? 
1.2.8 What were the key events that brought about a merging of the 
politics, problem and policy streams and therefore the opening of the 









1.3.1 Were policy actors grouped into coalitions based on core beliefs? 
What were those beliefs?  
1.3.2 Were policy actors grouped in a more fluid manner based on 
issues?  
1.3.3 To what extent were they “well organized” and resourced?  
1.3.4 What conflicting positions were there within and between 
coalitions? 
1.3.5 Was there evidence of information sharing between coalitions? 
1.3.6 Is there evidence of internal or external shocks to the coalitions, 





1.4.1 Did elected officials dominate the policy process? How? 
1.4.2 To what extent did non-elected policy actors influence the policy 
process? What strategies were used? 
1.4.3 To what extent were non-elected policy actors involved with (or 







invited to) generating policy alternatives? What strategies were used? 
1.4.4 What was the effect of the political structure in each province?  
1.4.5 To what extent did policy actors utilize technical information? 
Expert validators? 
1.4.6 Was information on other jurisdictions/provincial tuition policies 





1.5.1 Did other post-secondary issues affect policy deliberations? 
1.5.2 Did policy decisions from other arenas affect policy deliberations? 
1.5.3 Did the fiscal climate or budgeting affect policy deliberations? 
1.5.4 To what extent did public opinion influence policy deliberations?  
Note: Policy = tuition policy 
 Adapted from Ness (2008)
 
